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Abstract
In this note it is argued that post-entry should be distinguished
from pre-entry by the incurrence of capacity costs on the part of the
entrant rather than by the incurrence of set-up charges, as is done in
Dixit (1980). That Is, capacity costs should be thought of as fixed
costs for both incumbent and entrant and set-up charges are linked to
the decision whether to produce or not, but not to the purchase of
capacity. With this approach there is the possibility of multiple
equilibria in Dixit' s model, as is described in Dixit (1974). By
viewing the pre-entry capacity commitment and the post-entry play as
different stages of an extensive form game, as is done in Spulber
(1981), we examine which of these equilibria is perfect. It is shown
that multiple perfect equilibria are possible.
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I. Introduction
Dixit (1980) analyzes a post-entry and pre-entry duopoly game when
an incumbent firm can make a prior capacity commitment and both
entrant and incumbent face declining average production costs in the
form of fixed set-up charges. As a consequence of the declining
average costs, there is a limiting output level by the incumbent at
which the entrant's best response yields the entrant zero profit.
When the incumbent firm is committed to this output level the entrant
is indifferent between entering or not but, were it to enter under
these circumstances, it would do so at an output bounded away from
zero. Dixit poses the following two questions. When is a prior com-
mitment by the incumbent to a capacity level larger than the limiting
output equivalent to a commitment to produce beyond the limiting out-
put? If this equivalence holds, when does the incumbent prefer to
limit entry and when would it rather accommodate entry?
In a related paper, Dixit (1979) has shown that in a static duopoly
model where both firms face declining average cost curves, there can
be multiple Cournot equilibria. The monopoly output will yield a
Cournot equilibrium if the monopoly output is greater than the
limiting output. Under the identical cost and demand conditions there
can also be the standard Cournot equilibrium with both firms producing
positive amounts. Yet in Dixit (1980), though market conditions
satisfy the assumptions of the 1979 paper, this multiplicity does not
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arise. In this note it will be shown that Dixit discarded a potential
equilibrium in his analysis, i.e., one must confront the multiple
equilibria issue in general. One way of doing so is to recast the
model in extensive form, as in Spulber (1981), and then employ a more
restrictive solution concept to eliminate this multiplicity. In this
context, perfect equilibrium would seem to be the appropriate concept.
In deciding on the appropriate extensive form game the critical
question is whether it is proper to view capacity costs as part of
entrant marginal cost in the post-entry game. In this paper, we adopt
the point of view that post-entry is distinguished from pre-entry by
the incurrence of capacity costs on the part of the entrant. Hence, in
the post-entry game capacity costs do not enter into the marginal cost
calculation. This aproach differs from that of Dixit who distin-
guishes post-entry from pre-entry by the incurrence of set-up costs.
To justify our approach we cite Dixit [1980, p. 96]
I shall reduce the dynamic aspects to the barest
essentials by ignoring all lags. Either entry does
not occur at all, in which case the established
firm continues in a stationary state, or else it
occurs at once, and the post-entry equilibrium is
also established at once, so that the resulting
duopoly continues in its stationary state. It is
as if the two players see through the whole prob-
lem and implement the solution immediately...
In the stationary, post-entry duopoly, capacity costs are fixed rather
than variable costs because, according to Dixit,
The established firm chooses a pre-entry capacity
level k][. This may subsequently be increased, but
cannot be reduced...
In all periods subsequent to the period of entry the entrant is also
an established firm. Hence, it should treat Dixit' s constraint in the
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same manner as the incumbent firm. Dixit' s formal model, which has
capacity costs in the entrant marginal cost calculation, is really an
examination of in and out entry rather than the stationary, post-entry
duopoly that it purports to be.
The results of this paper show that when there is a unique perfect
equilibrium of the extensive form game, the conclusions of Dixit
(1980) still hold, i.e., the discarded equilibrium is not perfect.
However, it is possible for there to be multiple perfect equilibria.
We demonstrate when this is the case. The presence of multiple per-
fect equilibria leaves open the question concerning the equivalence of
a prior capacity commitment to a commitment to produce beyond the
limiting output level.
II. The Model and Results
We assume the identical cost and revenue functions posited by
Dixit (1980). Let the subscript 1 denote the established firm and 2
the prospective entrant. If firm i has capacity k. and is producing
output x. (with x. < k.), its costs per period will be
1 11 r r
(1) C, - fa + w.x. + r k if x. >i i 11 i i l
=0 if x. =
l
where f. is the fixed set-up cost, r. the constant cost per unit of
l l
capacity, and w the constant average variable cost for output.
The revenues per period for the two firms will be functions
R (x ,x_). The following properties are assumed to hold
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(2) R. > 0, R. . < 0, and R. < for i,j = 1,2 and i * j
,
and R1 (0,x ) = R2 (x 0) = 0.
In the absence of prior capacity, profits of firm i are given by
(3) Tr
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With prior capacity, k
,
profits of firm i are given by
(3*) ir.(x ,x
2
,k.) = R (x ,x ) - f. - w.x. - r. max(k. ,x )
if x >
=
-r k if x. « 0.
i l l
In Figure 1 (Figure 1 is a reproduction of Figure 3, Dixit [1980,
p. 99]), MM' and RR' represent the static reaction function for Firms
1 and 2 respectively, when capacity costs are included in marginal
costs and start-up costs are ignored. NN' is the static reaction
function for Firm 1 when capacity costs and start-up costs are
ignored. When start-up costs are present there is a point on RR'
,
call it B, B = (B , B ), such that ir (B) , the profits of Firm 2 at the
joint output vector B, equals 0. B. is the limiting output by Firm 1.
For any output by Firm 1 greater than B, , Firm 2 would rather make
zero profits by not entering than choose the output that would put it
on RR*
.
N'
M'
R
Figure 1
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Figure 1
.onSince Firm 1 makes a prior capacity commitment of k its reactic
function is given by the kinked curve in Figure 2 shown in heavy
lines. In what follows we do not concern ourselves with the effect of
start-up costs on Firm l's output decision.
Figure 2
N'
M'
Figure 2
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Dixit apparently claims that when tt.(V) > 0, V is the only Nash
equilibrium as long as k. _>_ V. . According to Dixit [1980, p. 100]
Case 2 . tt (V) > 0. Here the prospective entrant will
make a positive profit in any post entry equilibrium
so the established firm cannot hope to prevent entry.
It can only seek the best available duopoly position...
When tt (V) > 0, B
1
> V.. When B.. > N, Dixit is correct. But when
V < B
_<_ N and k > B there is a limiting Nash equilibrium, just as
in Dixit (1979). This limiting equilibrium is where
x.. = min[max (k. , M, ) , N. ] and x~ = 0. Suppose the limiting equilib-
rium prevails over the equilibrium V when B < k and 3
_<_ N . One
must still resolve whether it is preferable for Firm 1 to choose
k, > B, . Note however, that in some instances this is obvious as it
is possible for M > B > V . By Dixit 's own arguments it is con-
ceivable that Firm 1 limits even when tt (V) > 0.
As discussed in the introduction, the above equilibrium really
addresses the situation where the entrant is around for only one
period. One might reasonably ask the following question. Suppose
Firm 2 does enter, even if this entails losses. How does Firm 1
respond to this entry? This question cannot be solved by pure static
analysis. Spulber (1981) solves this problem when post-entry duopoly
lasts for one period. Through a small modification in his model we
can interpret this solution as Dixit wishes us to; the post-entry
duopoly continues in a stationary state. In addition, we include the
start-up costs that are not included in Spulber' s analysis.
Our extensive form game occurs in three stages. In the first
stage Firm 1 acts as a monopolist and purchases capacity, k . This
first stage is identical to the first period of Spulber' s model. In
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the second stage the entrant can purchase capacity, k . There is no
production in the second stage. This stage can be thought of as
occurring between the first and second period in Spulber's model. In
the third stage Firms 1 and 2 have prior capacity of k. and k
respectively. Both firms can buy additional capacity if they wish in
this stage and both firms are Nash quantity setters in their respec-
tive outputs. We first look at the equilibrium in the third stage
given k. and k . This equilibrium can be thought of as a stationary
state in the post-entry duopoly.
Firm l's reaction function for this third stage game is given in
Figure 2. However, Firm 2's reaction function is no longer given by
RR' to the left of B. Instead it is given by the kinked curve in
Figure 3 shown in heavy lines. As k has already been choosen in the
second stage, capacity costs do not enter into the marginal cost calcu-
lations for Firm 2 until its output reaches the prior capacity, k_.
However, since set-up charges are still incurred in the third stage,
when output is positive, Firm 2 might still find it advantageous to
produce nothing in the third stage to avoid the set-up charges.
Hence, there is a point, L, on Firm 2's reaction function such that
Tr (L,k_) -(- rk_ = 0. Since the fixed capacity costs do not enter into
the decision whether to produce in the third stage, it is evident that
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Figure 3
Suppose tt (V) > 0, k > B. , and k = V . There are two cases to
consider in understanding equilibrium of the third stage game. The
first is when L- > N_ . Then the only equilibrium in this stage is at
V. The second possibility is B. <_ L.
_<_ N. . Then for k- > L. there is
a limiting equilibrium in the third stage. There is still the equi-
librium at V. If for k. 2L V. , '^2. V9' v ^ s c^e unique equilibrium of
the third stage game, the limiting equilibrium of the extensive form
game is not perfect. However, when there are multiple equilibria of
the third stage game there can be multiple perfect equilibria. In the
first equilibrium, Firm 1 acts on its "rational belief" in stage one
that if it purchases capacity greater than L. , it will keep Firm 2
out. In the second equilibrium, Firm 1 acts on the rational belief
that it can never keep Firm 2 out. Note that even with the first type
Rk rt —
Figure 3
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of beliefs, Firm 1 may choose k < L..
,
i.e., there is a unique perfect
equilibrium. This will happen when limiting entry is too costly.
III. Conclusion
The results of the previous section suggest that whether capacity
is a credible entry deterrent depends on the beliefs of firms as to
which Nash equilibrium will arise post-entry. It seems reasonable then
to look at other actions by the incumbent, aside from capacity invest-
ment, which might affect the beliefs of a potential entrant. Expansion
of the formal model to include the possibility of other actions may be
helpful in this regard.
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